Stringers
chu0119/Pojun · chu0119

Pojun (破军): an open-source pentest agent caused trouble, its author deleted the repo, and someone picked it up the next day

What it is An AI automated penetration testing platform you run on your own machine: enter a target, and a group of AI agents handle recon, vulnerability discovery, and verification on their own, then deliver a Word vulnerability report.

Why it took off It was originally forked from ARTEX, the championship project whose author had just caused trouble and deleted it. The repo was created the day after the deletion with its lineage stated openly, and among a crowd of one-off copies it was one of the few updated daily and shipping with an installer and docs. After a popular November copy was exposed as having a backdoor, people looking for a trustworthy successor flocked to it.

DHow you could ride it Don't build another pentest agent or an ARTEX fork. If you really want to catch this wave of attention, build on the defensive side: tools that detect traces of autonomous attack agents, or scan repos and cloud for leaked keys, and post them in Chinese security communities and r/cybersecurity.

Grade D: the traffic comes from a one-off slot left by a famous project's deletion, already split among 56 copies, with the leading BaaRai/ARTEX at over 7 thousand stars. The topic is tied to real attacks and copies can be taken down at any time, so building it earns no lasting reputation. What the niche circles are saying
Data (updated daily) · Repo created 2026-10-09 · 412 stars · 7 days +283
GitHub · stars
020040011-0311-0711-1111-1611-20412
Data 2026-11-03 → 2026-11-20 (18 days, 18 observations). Points before 10-28 come from deeply / archive backfill, not every day has one

In Oct 2026-8, the author of ARTEX, an open-source AI pentesting tool, announced it was going closed-source and deleting the repo, because it had been used to attack Korean banks. The next evening, an account called chu0119 started from the final version of the code and built Pojun (破军). For its first 25 days it had only 41 stars; it took off in November, and by 11-18 it had 359 stars and 234 forks, with 11-17 gaining 84 stars in a single day. How did it end up ranked #10 among 56 rescue forks, and can others pull this off too? This piece breaks it down.

A championship project that got deleted

ARTEX is a "multi-agent autonomous penetration testing" framework open-sourced in 2026 Jul 26 by a Chinese developer (GitHub account Autumn-27). Given a target, a chain of AI agents divide the work among themselves: recon, finding vulnerabilities, verification, and writing the report. In August it won the championship of Baidu's "Agent+" attack-defense challenge and became very popular in Chinese security circles.

From late September into early October, several South Korean financial institutions leaked customer data in succession (36 Ke's tally: 9 firms, at least 65k records of personal and credit information). Security firms including CrowdStrike identified ARTEX as the core tool used by the attackers, and Reuters, the WSJ, and Lianhe Zaobao all reported it. On 8 Oct the author announced a move to closed source and an end to updates, and the original repo then disappeared from GitHub.

The code was deleted, but it was AGPL-licensed and had already been forked thousands of times. From the moment of the deletion, a large crop of "backup versions," "continuously maintained versions," and "international versions" appeared on GitHub. The defender-side site artex.sh, which tracks these copies, had indexed 56 by 11-16. Pojun was created on 10-09 18:15, and its README's source statement is very direct: it was originally forked from the original author's final version v0.3.15, and the 700 commits since, about 50k lines added, were written by the maintainer. The repo description reads "an independently evolved version of the original Baidu attack-defense championship project."

What it is

A platform installed on your own machine: a Go backend, a Next.js web console, and PostgreSQL for storage. In the web UI you enter a target and configure a large model key (Anthropic, OpenAI, or any compatible API), and it has a set of agents push the work forward, ending with a Word-format vulnerability report. Linux and macOS install with one command, Windows runs via Docker, and common security tools are bundled in the image. A companion repo, pojun-skill, packages its methodology as a skill pack that can be loaded into any AI agent (24 stars).

The README puts the most emphasis on "discipline": every target must state what counts as completion, and anything without proof of completion is marked "incomplete" in the report; high-severity findings must come with reproducible evidence; all traffic is logged so every step can be replayed; destructive operations are blocked by default. It also self-reports a set of test figures: 12 tasks, 56k tool calls, 295 vulnerabilities confirmed (author's claim, unverified).

The same README's disclaimer says it is for study and local verification only, strictly prohibits testing any live system, "whether or not authorized." It boasts of real-project results while forbidding live use, a stance common to this category of tools since the ARTEX incident.

Why this one took off

To be clear: what drove the traffic was the ARTEX story, not the Pojun product. The pentest-agent topic has never lacked builders: PentestGPT was open-sourced 2023 years ago and has 16,479 stars today; HexStrike AI was open-sourced in 2025 July and has 13,703 stars. What was missing was "that championship project": it became famous, was repeatedly named in the news, and then suddenly vanished. People who wanted to look at it, study it, or keep a copy all went looking for a substitute at once.

Among 56 copies, Pojun ranked #10, and #1 in artex.sh's "offensive" category, thanks to three things:

It came early and said exactly what it was. Created the day after the deletion, renamed to its own name, with its lineage spelled out in the description. Anyone searching "ARTEX championship project" or "ARTEX alternative" could see at a glance what it was.

It was the one that kept being updated. Many copies were one-off snapshots from the day of the deletion: Hinln/ARTEX was created 10-08 and its last push came 6 minutes later, with no changes since. Pojun shipped up to v0.4.82 in 40 days, pushing code almost every day, with CI, an installer, and docs. People wanted more than an "archive"; they wanted a successor that someone was still looking after.

After the copies got into trouble, trustworthiness became valuable. In 4 Nov, someone on Zhihu exposed a popular ARTEX copy as containing a backdoor allowing remote code execution. Pojun's star growth picked up right in those days: 11-03 was 41 stars, and 11-06 was 75 stars (inference: the two are related, though there is no direct evidence). Among a pile of copies of unknown origin, a project that states its source, has a public commit history, and offers checksums is more reassuring.

Where the stars came from

DatestarforkWhat happened those days
10-09Repo createdThe day after ARTEX was deleted
11-034121Almost no one noticed for the first 25 days
11-067535A popular 11-04 copy was exposed as having a backdoor
11-1312958CSDN security account HackTwoHub posted a promotional article titled "Pojun 破军a multi-agent autonomous AI red-team penetration platform"
11-16209133artex.sh gave it its own page; someone has already made an English version
11-1834922411-17 single-day +84, the most in a single day so far

Source: daily figures from the GitHub repo page (Beijing time); the incident comes from Zhihu, CSDN, and artex.sh pages.

A few things worth noting:

  • All of the spread happened in Chinese security circles. A CSDN promotional article, the Telegram security feed channel cvebird, Zhihu, a GitCode reprint, and several YouTube security creators. The same promotional article was reposted on another CSDN account with 236 reads. The circle is small but tightly concentrated. It never made GitHub trending (repos under about 60 days old can't get in), and no media outlet covered it on its own.
  • Unusually many forks. 234 forks against 359 stars, a ratio of 0.65; typical projects sit around 0.1. That isn't "looks good, I'll give it a star"; it's "save a copy while it's still around." The whole ARTEX family behaves this way: jiwoochris/artex-global has 3,848 stars and 3,279 forks, and Hinln/ARTEX has more forks (2,198) than stars (1,674).
  • People have started building on it too. artex.sh logged two projects built on it: one based on Pojun v0.4.70 with added intranet attack features (21 stars), and one English version (created 11-16, 4 stars).

Who it's competing with

NameScale (11-18)How it differs from Pojun
BaaRai/ARTEX7,192 star / 3,171 forkA large copy created the day of the deletion, still being updated, the biggest in this family
jiwoochris/artex-global3,848 / 3,279An international version, English by default, switchable to Korean, Chinese, Spanish, and Japanese
RuoJi6/ARTEX2,212 / 1,316A "continuously maintained open-source version" that takes the original's path and internationalizes it
AntiFox-AI/antifox753 / 479Reports say it has already been used in real attacks
PentestGPT16,479An established player since 2023, more of an interactive assistant than a fully automated one
HexStrike AI13,703English-speaking community, connects over a hundred tools via MCP

Another reference point: mhtsec/ARTEX, which had 4,405 stars a few days earlier, showed 404 when 11-18 was opened again. Repos in this family can disappear at any time.

If it were you

D. Take a look, but don't follow. Pojun rides the one-off slot of "a famous project caused trouble and was deleted, and a trustworthy successor is needed." That slot has already been split among dozens of copies, with the leader being BaaRai/ARTEX at 7 thousand stars. Building another pentest agent or an ARTEX fork gets you neither stars nor anything else, and it means working on something tied to real attacks.

  • Who it suits: teams already doing security research or with a legitimate authorized-testing business, using it as a reference for "where the industry is now," and reading its engineering choices such as the target gating and evidence grading.
  • Who it doesn't suit: individual developers hoping to earn stars and fame through an open-source project. If this topic blows up, the risk is legal (China's Cybersecurity Law explicitly bans providing tools designed for intrusion), and the fame turns into infamy.
  • If you do build, build on the defensive side. artex.sh is itself an example: it catalogs each copy, categorizes them, and lists them without install links, producing intelligence for defenders. Along this line, tools that "detect traces left by a certain class of autonomous attack agents" or "check whether your own repos and cloud have leaked keys" could catch the same wave of attention while standing on the right side (inference; we have not seen a project in this direction gain traction yet).
  • How to get users: the same channels: CSDN accounts in Chinese security circles, Zhihu columns, and the Telegram security feed channels; in the English world, r/cybersecurity and security vendor blogs.
  • Timing: ARTEX's news heat peaked in October, and by mid-November the copies were already sustaining the story with their own incidents (backdoors, takedowns). Defense-oriented work needs to ship before this round of discussion fades, roughly before the end of the year.
  • What would show you were wrong: if attack-oriented copies like Pojun keep growing over the next month or two, aren't taken down by GitHub, and aren't pulled into a new incident, that would suggest the risk of this category of tools is smaller than we estimate, and the topic is viable.

GitHub repo ↗

Research notes: competitor table, acquisition evidence, full research report
Competitors
NameWhereLaunchedScaleHow it differs from this one
GreyDGL/PentestGPTOpen source2023-0216,429★/2,878 forks (our GitHub repo)Interactive AI pentest assistant that gives suggestions; Pojun goes fully autonomous with a multi-agent closed loop, plus C2, post-exploitation, and formal Word reports
0x4m4/HexStrike AIOpen source2025-0713,607★ (our github library)MCP + 150 tool orchestration, aimed at the English-speaking crowd; Pojun is native Chinese, emphasizing evidence gates and disciplined process
Villager(Kali+DeepSeek)Open source2025Covered by several security media outletsHooks Kali tools to DeepSeek for automated attacks; Pojun focuses on acceptance and evidence-grading discipline
wgpsec/tchkillerOpen source2026A newer Chinese-circle project, smaller in sizeBuilt on claude-agent-sdk; a parallel competitor to Pojun, not the same lineage
The original ARTEX project and 40+ copies (mhtsec/BaaRai/jiwoochris/RuoJi6/AntiFox/artex-ko-plus, etc.)Open sourceFrom ¥2026-07A single copy often has thousands of stars (our github library)Same root, same topic; Pojun is one of the few built into a complete product (own brand, all-platform installer, UI, docs) as an independent evolution, not a direct git fork
Where users come from
  • Confirmed Platform event / takedown vacuum (ARTEX went closed-source and the next day a repo claiming its name appeared, riding the 'Baidu security contest champion project' label): ARTEX 2026-10-08 went closed-source (163.com/ifeng), Pojun 2026-10-09 created a repo the next day and calls itself an independent evolution of it (data card created_at + README)
  • Confirmed Promotion on a Chinese security content site (CSDN): blog.csdn.net/2603_95775469 2026-11-13 published a promotional post, 'Pojun… unattended penetration testing'
  • Confirmed Spread across security circles on Telegram / Zhihu / GitCode: the Telegram security feed channel cvebird (t.me/s/cvebird), Zhihu, GitCode/AtomGit reposts (found via Jina search)
  • Inferred: ARTEX incident spillover search demand: fork/star ratio 0.64 is a save-to-keep kind of bookmarking, syncing with the panic over ARTEX-family apps being pulled

chu0119/Pojun — why did it reach 38 stars in 209 days

This report only analyzes the market and growth behind why it took off. Pojun is an autonomous pentesting/red-team dual-use security tool; the report does not repeat its attack methods or installation steps.

One line

A Go + Next.js LLM multi-agent autonomous pentesting / red-team platform: give it one sentence of goal and it automatically runs reconnaissance → vulnerability verification → exploitation → post-exploitation → report generation, with a one-click installer, 66 tools in its toolchain, and a companion pojun-skill skill package. (Source: GitHub README github.com/chu0119/Pojun)

Bottom line: it didn't rise on the product alone; it caught a vacuum left by a global news event.

The root cause of its rise is the 'ARTEX incident'. The timeline lines up precisely:

  • ARTEX is an open-source autonomous pentest agent built by a Chinese engineer. It went up on GitHub 2026-07, and 2026-08 it won the championship in Baidu's "agent+" attack-defense challenge. (Source: 3636Kr / Internet Law Review eu.36kr.com/zh/p/4022247669372809)
  • From 2026-09 to 10, ARTEX was used to attack 9 South Korean financial institutions, leaking at least 65k pieces of personal and credit data, and South Korea entered a national cybersecurity emergency; a CrowdStrike report named ARTEX as a core tool. (Source: same as above; SOCPrime socprime.com/.../artex-ai-driven-attack-campaign-hits-seven-south-korean-financial-firms)
  • 2026-10-08, the original ARTEX author announced that because the tool was being abused, it was moving from open source to closed source and issued a disclaimer; ThreatBook (微步在线) stepped in on the copyright acquisition. (Source: NetEase 163.com/dy/article/LB81NLLJ0511A5GF.html; Phoenix Finance finance.ifeng.com/c/8xq3O35xPDU)
  • 2026-10-09, chu0119/Pojun created the repo, calling itself an 'independent evolution of the original Baidu attack-defense champion project'. (Source: data card created_at; README)

In other words, a 'champion project' that had just been hyped to the top of the Chinese security community and then suddenly went closed-source and was taken down left a huge demand vacuum and search traffic, and Pojun created a repo the day after the closure to take it over. This is the classic 'rename or fork-and-take-over after takedown' pattern.

Growth data (source: our github library repo_profile/repo_day unless otherwise noted)

  • 38 days: 209 stars, 133 forks; in the last 7 days +124, and accelerating day by day: 11-13 → 129 → 11-14 → 155 → 11-15 → 172 → 11-16 (single day +209 37).
  • The fork/star ratio is as high as 133/209 ≈ 0.64, far above a typical project (usually <0.1). This isn't 'liked it, so I starred it'; it's a grab-to-save bookmarking driven by the fear that it might vanish, directly tied to the panic over the ARTEX family being taken down.
  • Frequent maintenance: within 38 days it shipped to v0.4.63/v0.4.72, pushed_at updated daily, issue-driven fixes. The effort is real, not an empty placeholder.

Visibility: circulating in small circles (the Chinese attack-defense community), largely unnoticed outside.

  • Not on GitHub trending (data card trending_days_any=0), and no mainstream media has covered Pojun on its own (the coverage is about the ARTEX incident itself).
  • No revenue, no TrustMRR (an AGPL open-source tool, not profit-driven).
  • Spread is concentrated in Chinese channels: CSDN security-account promo posts (blog.csdn.net/2603_95775469, where 2026-11-13 published 'Pojun… unattended penetration testing'), the Telegram security feed channel cvebird (t.me/s/cvebird), Zhihu, GitCode/AtomGit reposts, and YouTube security creators. (Source: Jina search results)
  • A counter-signal makes the point: artex.sh, the defense-side tracking site maintained by the original ARTEX camp, has given Pojun its own page, classifying it as an 'offensive-type branch' (one of 49 copies, marked 111 stars, version independent, listed only for defenders with no install link). (Source: artex.sh/zh/forks/chu0119-pojun) Being watched by defenders shows it already has a name in the community.

Copycats / where it sits in the ecosystem

Strictly speaking, Pojun is itself one of ARTEX's copycats, not a target of copying. After ARTEX went closed-source, a large crowd of grab-named copies, renames, and forks appeared, many far bigger than Pojun (source: our github library, by stars):

  • mhtsec/ARTEX (4405★/6607 forks), BaaRai/ARTEX (3613★), jiwoochris/artex-global (3454★), RuoJi6/ARTEX (1994★), Hinln/ARTEX (1606★)
  • Localized / weaponized branches: bdg9412/artex-ko-plus (Korean, 274★), AntiFox-AI/antifox (687★, reported as used in attacks on AWS, source Threads @albert.poyu), Xiao1an/ARTEX-God (100★), panda0x123/artex-ymh
  • Risk warning: there are reports that 'popular ARTEX forks carry backdoors that can lead to RCE' (source: Zhihu zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/2103786901723525735). This crowd of grab-named copies is a mixed bag.

At 209 stars Pojun sits in the middle of this group, but it's one of the few that has been built into a complete product (own brand name, all-platform installer, web console, documentation), rather than a direct git fork of the original repo.

Competitors (doing the same thing)

NameWhereLaunchedScaleHow Pojun differs from the rest
GreyDGL/PentestGPTOpen source2023-0216,429★/2,878 forkLeans toward an 'AI-assisted pentest assistant' that gives interactive suggestions; Pojun runs a multi-agent fully autonomous loop
0x4m4/HexStrike AIOpen source2025-0713,607★MCP + 150+ tool orchestration aimed at the English crowd; Pojun is native Chinese and includes C2, post-exploitation, and formal Word reports
Villager(Kali+DeepSeek)Open source2025Covered by several security media outletsHooks Kali tools to DeepSeek for automated attacks; Pojun emphasizes evidence gates and disciplined process
wgpsec/tchkillerOpen source2026Chinese intelligent pentesting built on claude-agent-sdkA newer Chinese-circle project, smaller in size; a parallel competitor rather than the same lineage
The original ARTEX project and its 40+ copiesOpen sourceFrom ¥2026-07A single copy often has thousands of starsSame root, same topic; Pojun is the independent evolution among them that was built into a product

'No competitors' is a false premise: this niche has been crowded since 2025 (PentestGPT and HexStrike are both at the ten-thousand-star level). Pojun's opportunity isn't being 'first to build it'; it's that at the moment ARTEX went closed-source, amid the Chinese-circle traffic wave, there happened to be a ready-to-use successor.

Differentiation, and whether it's a manufactured ranking

Pojun's README places its selling point on 'discipline / engineering rigor': a goal-acceptance gate (goal_met; if not everything is achieved it is forcibly recorded as incomplete), L1–L4 evidence grading, automatic continuation of the attack chain, per-request MITM logging with sha256 versioning, multi-channel LLM polling with circuit breaking (measured cache hit rate 93%), formal Word reports, 66 tools installed in one click, and zero-host-install via Docker.

  • This engineering polish is why it stands out and retains users among a pile of bare forks (others copy the original repo; it is a finished product that runs, produces reports, and installs).
  • But it is not the reason it took off. The takeoff came from the ARTEX incident; the polish determines whether it ranks in the upper-middle of 49 copies instead of sinking.

What to borrow

  1. Watch for platform events / takedown vacuums: when a well-known project is suddenly taken down or closed, search and 'save a copy' demand spikes instantly; creating a repo the next day and claiming to be the 'independent evolution of XX' lets you catch that demand. The keys are speed (the day after the closure) and riding the name ('Baidu security contest champion project').
  2. The fork/star ratio is a thermometer for scarcity panic: 0.64's extremely high ratio directly reveals the fear of it disappearing and the rush to save it. This kind of traction climbs fast but can be wiped out at any time by platform or compliance risk.
  3. In a sea of bare forks, turning the code into something that installs, runs, and delivers (installer + UI + reports + docs) is enough to move up from the middle tier. Product quality here is a lever for retention and differentiation, not for acquisition.

Still uncertain / risks

  • The claim of being the 'independent evolution of the original Baidu attack-defense champion project' is doubtful: the original champion project's author is ztx888, while Pojun's author chu0119 is another account (with only 2 repos and 253 stars in total), and artex.sh marks it as version=independent (not a direct GitHub fork, more like a rewrite or rename). Its real relationship with the original author is unverified, and the 'champion' badge is likely marketing.
  • Extremely high dual-use and compliance risk: the same-family AntiFox has already appeared in real attacks (Korean banks, AWS), and some ARTEX forks have been reported to carry backdoors; Pojun could be taken down by GitHub or pulled into the incident at any time, so its star curve is not sustainable.
  • Revenue: none (open source, not profit-oriented), no verification needed.

This article was written by AI from public data and the data we collect daily. Numbers are sourced, and inferences are labeled.